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Abstract
In this thesis, we make contributions to secure and privacy preserving use of electronic credentials in
three different levels.
First, we address the case in credential systems where a credential owner wants to show her credential
to a verifier without taking the risk that the ability to prove ownership of her credential is transferred
to the verifier. We define credential ownership proof protocols for credentials signed by standard
signature schemes. We also propose proper security definitions for the protocol, aiming to protect the
security of both the credential issuer and the credential owner against concurrent attacks. We give two
generic constructions of credential ownership proofs based on identity-based encryption and identity-
based identification schemes. Furthermore, we show that signatures with credential ownership proofs
are equivalent to identity-based identification schemes, in the sense that any secure construction of
each implies a secure construction of the other. Moreover, we show that the GQ identification protocol
yields an efficient credential ownership proof for credentials signed by the RSA signature scheme and
prove the protocol concurrently-secure.
Then, we give a generic construction for universal (mutli) designated-verifier signature schemes from
a large class of signature schemes, referred to as Class C. The resulting schemes are efficient and
have two important properties. Firstly, they are provably DV-unforgeable, non-transferable and also
non-delegatable. Secondly, the signer and the designated verifier can independently choose their
cryptographic settings. We also propose a generic construction for (hierarchical) identity-based sig-
nature schemes from any signature scheme in C and prove that the construction is secure against
adaptive chosen message and identity attacks. We discuss possible extensions of our constructions to
identity-based ring signatures and identity-based designated-verifier signatures from any signature in
C. Furthermore, we show that it is possible to combine the above constructions to obtain signatures
with combined functionalities.
Finally, inspired by the recent developments in attribute-based encryption, we propose threshold
attribute-based signatures (t-ABS). In a t-ABS, signers are associated with a set of attributes and
verification of a signed document against a verification attribute set succeeds if the signer has a
threshold number of (at least t) attributes in common with the verification attribute set. A t-ABS
scheme enables a signature holder to prove possession of signatures by revealing only the relevant (to
the verification attribute set) attributes of the signer, hence providing signer-attribute privacy for the
signature holder. We define t-ABS schemes, formalize their security and propose two t-ABS schemes:
a basic scheme secure against selective forgery and a second one secure against existential forgery, both
provable in the standard model, assuming hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. We
V
show that our basic t-ABS scheme can be augmented with two extra protocols that are used for effi-
ciently issuing and verifying t-ABS signatures on committed values. We call the augmented scheme
a threshold attribute based c-signature scheme (t-ABCS). We show how a t-ABCS scheme can be
used to realize a secure threshold attribute-based anonymous credential system (t-ABACS) providing
signer-attribute privacy. We propose a security model for t-ABACS and give a concrete scheme using
t-ABCS scheme. Using the simulation paradigm, we prove that the credential system is secure if the
t-ABCS scheme is secure.
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Notation
Xyz algorithm Xyz
xyz security notion xyz
Xyz oracle Xyz
Xyz string Xyz
ε the empty string
Poly (k) the set of all algorithms polynomial time in k
StX internal state information of algorithm X
‖ concatenation
\ set subtraction
|x| bit length of the quantity x
|S| cardinality of the set S
ϕ(·) Euler’s totient function
x← a value a is assigned to variable x
x
N← a value a mod N is assigned to variable x
x
$← X a member is chosen randomly from set X and assigned to variable x
x← X (a; r : O) algorithm X with access to oracle O, input a, and random tape r is
run and the output is assigned to variable x
A −(X )→ B | C A sends X to B if condition C holds
(s, t)← [X (x)↔ Y(y)] (a) interactive protocol between X with private input x and Y with
private input y is run with public input a, X outputs s and Y
outputs y
Tr [X (x)↔ Y(y)] (a) transcript of a protocol run with public input a between X with
private input x and Y with private input y
ZK-PoK{x : a = gx} zero knowledge proof of knowledge of x such that a = gx, where a and
g are public inputs to the protocol
X (a) algorithm X with input a and description [desc.] is run and x is
[desc.] returned as output
Return x
X
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